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The federal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is one 
of the largest anti-poverty programs in the nation, 
offering tax credits to low- and moderate-earning 
families.1 The amount of EITC benefits varies by earnings 
and the number of dependent children in a family, with 
considerably more generous benefits going to families 
with children. In addition to the federal EITC, as of 2015, 
twenty-six states and the District of Columbia provided 
additional EITC dollars.2 Most state EITCs are generally 
structured such that they offer credits equal to a propor-
tion of the federal EITC, varying from 3.5 percent in 
Louisiana to 40 percent in Washington, DC. 
This brief documents the estimated effects of state 
EITC benefits on rates of poverty in 2010–2014 using 
the Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social 
and Economic Supplement (ASEC). First, we examine 
Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM) rates and aver-
age EITC benefits across states with a fully refundable 
EITC between 2010 and 2014, and estimate how much 
higher poverty rates would have been in the absence of 
the state EITC. Next, we analyze how trends in poverty 
and state EITC benefits vary by race, marital status, 
metropolitan status, and region among these states. 
Finally, we project hypothetical differences in poverty 
rates for non-EITC states had they adopted EITCs of 
various generosities over this same time period. 
It is important to note that we do not model behav-
ioral changes that might result from the removal or 
addition of EITC benefits. Therefore, the analyses 
presented here are a simplified representation of such 
hypothetical scenarios. The SPM is an obvious choice 
for this analysis because, unlike the official poverty 
measure (OPM), which accounts only for before-tax 
cash income, the SPM also considers in-kind benefits, 
refundable tax credits, and out-of-pocket work and 
medical expenses when estimating resources. 
The impact of state EITC benefits 
varies by race, marital status, metro-
politan status, and region (Table 2). 
For instance, the average state EITC 
benefit for non-white- or Hispanic-
headed households is $495, lifting 
0.7 percent of this population out of 
poverty. This contrasts with house-
holds headed by a white, non-His-
panic individual, which receive an 
average state EITC benefit of $375, 
lifting 0.2 percent of this group 
out of poverty. Although married 
families are much less likely to be 
poor than are non-married families, 
married families receive greater 
average ETIC benefits—which is not 
surprising given that the structure 
of EITC is more generous to mar-
ried families than to single filers. 
Average EITC benefits vary across 
place, too: metropolitan families 
Findings
Table 1 presents the estimated 
effects of state EITC benefits on 
rates of poverty in states with a 
fully refundable EITC between 
2010 to 2014. On average, indi-
viduals in EITC states receive a 
17.6 percent match of their fed-
eral EITC benefit, and it pulls an 
estimated 0.3 percent of these 
states’ combined populations out 
of poverty. Children receive the 
greatest benefit, as state EITCs 
reduce child poverty by an esti-
mated 0.7 percentage point overall, 
from 16.5 percent to 15.8 percent. 
Unsurprisingly, these estimated 
effects are even greater in more 
generous locales: EITC programs 
in Washington, DC; New York; and 
Vermont reduce child poverty by 
more than a full percentage point, 
or proportional reductions of 4.3 
percent, 8.3 percent, and 10.2 
percent, respectively, due to their 
EITC programs. 
Even if families are not lifted 
out of poverty, state EITCs have a 
substantial impact: 43.2 percent of 
the poor in fully refundable states 
receive state EITC benefits3 at an 
average of $455 per family, which 
is roughly on par with the average 
state EITC refund in these states. 
Given the relatively low earnings 
of those who remain poor despite 
receiving EITC benefits, the practi-
cal impact of the benefit—which 
on average represents 2.4 percent of 
family earnings—is considerable. 
Research suggests that even small 
cash injections that state EITCs pro-
vide can have a meaningful effect 
for low-income families.4
TABLE 1. STATE EITC IMPACT ON SUPPLEMENTAL POVERTY MEASURE (SPM) RATES FOR ALL PEOPLE AND CHILDREN 
ONLY, 2010–2014
Note: a. As of 2015, 26 states and the District of Columbia included a refundable EITC in their income tax systems; for the 17 states (and DC) listed here, the credit was fully 
in effect for the 2010–2014 study period. California recently enacted an EITC and is not captured by our 2010–2014 data. Connecticut has an EITC for a portion of the sample 
period. Colorado and Washington State have passed EITC legislation but have yet to fund their programs. Delaware, Ohio, Virginia, and Maine had EITC programs that were 
not fully refundable over the years of the sample (Maine’s became fully refundable in 2015). Oklahoma currently has a nonrefundable EITC, but had a refundable EITC during 
the years of the sample. b. Iowa’s EITC doubled from 7 percent to 14 percent in 2014. c. Maryland’s EITC is extended to filers without qualifying children. d. Michigan’s EITC 
was lowered from 20 percent to 6 percent in 2012. e. This is an average of all Minnesota EITC filers, taken from http://www.cbpp.org/research/a-hand-up-how-state-earned-
income-tax-credits-help-working-families-escape-poverty-in-2011. f. New Jersey’s EITC was lowered from 25 percent to 20 percent in 2010. In 2015, it was increased to 
30 percent. g. Oregon’s EITC is now 8 percent. h. Wisconsin matched 11 percent for one child, 14 percent for two children, and 43 percent for three or more children through 
2011, at which point levels were decreased to 4 percent, 11 percent, and 34 percent for one, two, and three or more children, respectively. 
Source: Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC), 2011–2015. 
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receive EITC benefits nearly a fifth 
larger than non-metropolitan fami-
lies, and state EITC benefits in the 
Northeast are more than three times 
greater than those in the West. 
States without an EITC pro-
gram—which are more likely to 
be found in the South and West—
tend to be poorer than states with 
their own EITC. If non-EITC 
states had comparable EITC pro-
grams in place, they would have 
experienced greater reductions 
in poverty than those estimated 
for EITC states. Table 3 illustrates 
hypothetical differences in poverty 
rates over 2010–2014 had states 
implemented EITCs at a rate of 10 
percent, 20 percent, or 30 percent 
of the federal EITC; we use these 
levels because the majority of 
states with their own EITCs offer 
a percentage of the federal EITC 
within the 10 to 30 percent range. 
Similar to the previous analysis (in 
Table 1), state EITCs have roughly 
double the effect on absolute child 
poverty rates as they do on overall 
poverty rates. Additionally, effects 
vary across states. We estimate 
that Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, 
Nevada, and Texas would all have 
experienced child poverty rates at 
least 1.5 percentage points lower 
in the case of a 30 percent match 
of the federal EITC. The greatest 
drop under such a scenario would 
have occurred in Arizona, where 
child poverty rates would have 
fallen from 22.0 percent to 20.2 
percent—or by nearly a tenth. 
Policy Discussion
In this brief, we document state 
reductions in poverty—both over-
all and for children specifically—in 
those places that have fully refund-
able EITC programs. Additionally, 
we perform analyses by population 
subgroups and also estimate the 
hypothetical reductions in poverty 
if states without an EITC adopted 
one. Although the federal EITC 
program is larger in scale than state 
EITC programs, the latter do have 
a measureable impact on poverty—
especially child poverty. And for 
those families who receive state 
EITC benefits but remain poor, 
the EITC nonetheless supplies a 
meaningful portion of their total 
resources—nearly 2.4 percent of 
total family earnings on average.
Given the relatively low admin-
istrative costs associated with EITC 
programs when compared to other 
TABLE 2.  STATE EITC IMPACT ON SUPPLEMENTAL POVERTY MEASURE (SPM) 
RATES ACROSS SUBGROUPS, 2010–2014 
Note: Includes states with fully refundable EITC over all years of the sample (2010–2014). * 0.9 percent of the 
sample has an unidentified metropolitan status. 
Source: Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC), 2011–2015. 
TABLE 3. HYPOTHETICAL REDUCTIONS IN SUPPLEMENTAL POVERTY MEASURE 
(SPM) RATES IF STATES WERE TO ADOPT EITC FOR ALL PEOPLE AND CHILDREN 
ONLY, 2010–2014  
Note: Margins of error (“+/-”) refer to the 95 percent confidence intervals. 
Source: Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC), 2011–2015. 
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anti-poverty programs, as well as 
the fact that few states currently 
support generous EITC schemes, a 
substantial expansion in the scale 
and scope of current state EITC 
programs could have a significant 
impact on the circumstances of 
many low-income families in the 
United States. Moreover, the federal 
EITC is an important anti-poverty 
program because the assistance is 
post-tax and therefore does not 
generally impact eligibility for 
other safety-net programs. The state 
EITC programs analyzed here work 
roughly the same way in that they 
provide post-tax income for work-
ing families. This and other unique 
aspects of the EITC—requiring 
work, being offered as a once-a-year 
lump sum—mean that the EITC 
functions differently than other 
safety net programs. For instance, it 
can incentivize work among lower-
income households,5 and EITC 
payments are often used in novel 
ways such as bill payment and debt 
reduction.6 In short, the EITC is 
an important complement to other 
anti-poverty programs. 
Data
This brief uses data from the 
Current Population Survey (CPS) 
Annual Social and Economic 
Supplement (ASEC) from 2011 
to 2015. The ASEC questions are 
asked throughout the year and 
released with the March data set. 
Questions about income refer to the 
previous calendar year, so results 
can be interpreted as the average 
over the 2010–2014 time period. 
Roughly 200,000 individuals are 
included each year, resulting in a 
final sample of 1,007,595 observa-
tions analyzed in this brief. The 
2014 CPS ASEC utilized a prob-
ability split panel design to test 
a new set of income questions. 
Approximately three-eighths of the 
sample were randomly assigned to 
be eligible to receive the redesigned 
income questions, and the remain-
ing five-eighths of the sample were 
eligible to receive the set of ASEC 
income questions that had been 
in use since 1994. We combined 
these two subsets to create a single, 
harmonized 2014 data set. We then 
used the redesigned income ques-
tions for the entire 2015 CPS ASEC 
sample. Although data are avail-
able for 2015, we did not use these 
more recent data because changing 
definitions of metropolitan and 
non-metropolitan status between 
2015 and 2016 impede the analysis 
of metropolitan status from such a 
pooled data set.7 
The CPS ASEC uses a tax model 
calculator to simulate tax income 
rather than tax information col-
lected directly from respondents.8 
Various state and federal taxes and 
credits, including the federal EITC, 
are simulated for each tax filing 
unit.9 We derive the state EITC 
benefit for each tax unit by using its 
imputed federal EITC and the value 
of its state’s EITC match in the previ-
ous year (as EITC refunds are made 
in the following year and thus affect 
poverty accordingly).10 Because tax 
credits are simulated, it is possible 
that some families who receive the 
EITC may not be included and oth-
ers who do not file/claim EITC or 
who are not eligible for EITC ben-
efits (for example, undocumented 
immigrants) may be assigned a value 
due to errors in the tax model. 
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E n d n o t e s
1. An earlier brief by the authors, which 
examined the impact of the federal 
EITC on poverty over these same years, 
can be found at https://carsey.unh.edu/
publication/federal-eitc.
2. New York, NY, and Montgomery 
County, MD, have instituted additional 
working tax credits beyond those 
already offered within their states.
3. Of the poor in fully refundable 
EITC states, 43.2 percent received 
EITC benefits but remained poor, 
23.5 percent belonged to families 
that worked but did not receive EITC 
benefits, while 33.4 percent did not 
work or have a working family member.
4. For instance, see Yannet M. 
Lathrop, “The Michigan EITC: A 
Small Investment That Makes a Big 
Difference” (Lansing, MI: Michigan 
League for Public Policy, 2013), and 
Caroline M. Sallee, “Economic Benefits 
of the Earned Income Tax Credit in 
Michigan” (East Lansing, MI: Anderson 
Economic Group, 2009).
5. See N. Eissa and H. Hoynes, 
“Redistribution and Tax Expenditures: 
The Earned Income Tax Credit,” 
National Tax Journal 64, no. 2 (2011): 
689–729. 
6. See R. Mendenhall et al., “The Role 
of Earned Income Tax Credit in the 
Budgets of Low-Income Families,” 
Social Service Review 86, no. 3 (2012): 
367–400.





8. For more information, see https://
www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/
publications/oharataxmodel.pdf.
9. A tax filing unit may consist of an 
individual or a married couple who 
files a tax return jointly, along with 
dependents of that individual or 
married couple. 
10. For instance, a tax unit with a 
$1,000 federal EITC in the state of New 
York (which has a 30 percent match) 
would have a $300 state EITC. A 
number of states changed the matching 
amount during the sample period, and 
this was accounted for. 
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